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Abstract: 
 
3D printing poses a challenge to traditional IP protection because of the nature of the technological 
convergence inherent within it. Technological convergence exists where a product takes on new roles, 
in the same way that a mobile phone is now capable of taking photos and playing video. This can lead 
to convergence within legal regulation as well; i.e. combining telephonic regulation with privacy and 
copyright.13D printing poses a significant challenge due to the amount of legal convergence. A 3D 
printed product may be regulated by copyright, patent, trade marks, passing off, design rights (both 
registered and unregistered), contract law, among other areas. Ultimately, 3D printing raises the issue 
of how law and regulation should deal with the situation where technologies converge, causing laws 
to overlap and conflict. This paper argues that in this situation, a new type of right should be 
introduced to harmonise existing law.  
 
Keywords – 3D printing, convergence, copyright, patent, trade marks. 
 
Introduction 
 
Convergence has been a longstanding topic of discussion among those working in the technology 
sector and in particular 3D printing.2 Convergence refers to the way in which technologies originally 
designed for different purposes have come together within a single device or application. Multimedia 
applications are one example, where video, music and text are combined together; mobile phones 
are another where computers, email, cameras, satellite navigation and numerous other functions 
                                               
* With thanks to Professor Andrea Lista, University of Exeter, for his comments on the earlier draft, as well as those of 
Professor Hing Kai Chan, University of Nottingham Ningbo (China), Dr Abhilash Nair, Aston University, and Dr Phoebe Li, 
University of Sussex.  
1 For an example, see the rise of the right to be forgotten which has developed out of privacy rights and technological 
regulation. For consideration of the impact see inter alia H Grant, R Jay and C Craig, Encyclopaedia of Data Protection 
and Privacy (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2012), Volume 1, Part 1, Chapter 10 at 1-692 and A Mullis and R Parkes, 
Gatley on Libel and Slander (London: Sweet & Maxwell,2013), 12th edition, Main Volume, Part III, Chapter 22, Section 4, 
22.19. 
2 For a discussion of the various forms, see K Choi, ‘A Research Analysis on the Concept of Converging 
Technology and Converging Types of Information Technology’ ICIS '09: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference 
on Interaction Sciences: Information Technology, Culture and Human (2009) at 1422, A Nordmann (Rapporteur), 
Converging Technologies – Shaping the Future of European Societies, European Commission research (2004) at 14 
available at http://www.ntnu.no/2020/final_report_en.pdf, and for an example see  N Rosenberg, ‘Technological 
Change in the Machine Tool Industry, 1840-1910: Discussion’, 23 Journal of Economic History (1963) 444 at 444; F 
Kodama, Emerging Patterns of Innovation : Source of Japan’s Technological Edge, 4 Harvard Business School Press 
(1995) 414-443. On 3DP, see P Diamandis, 3D Printing and Technology Convergence, at 
http://www.diamandis.com/blog/3d-printing-technology-convergence; J Reitz, 3D Printing Today: Democratization of 
Technology and Disruptive Innovation Converge, at https://3dprint.com/207176/democratization-innovation/ .  
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have been brought together. Whilst these existing examples of technological convergence did not 
lead to an equivalent legal convergence,3 recent technological developments have led to such a 
situation. This has happened in the advances concerning 3D printing, where numerous laws may 
apply over a single 3D printed article, with conflicting results. Other technologies are on the horizon 
that also are likely to lead to legal convergence, including areas such as 4D printing, artificial 
intelligence and augmented reality. This paper will outline how legal convergence leads to self-
conflicted law, where conflicts in application lead to the overall aim of the law being stifled. The paper 
will outline how this conflict can be resolved with the creation of a sui generis right. 
 
In making the argument for a sui generis right, the paper will focus on 3D printing, as this is the area 
where legal convergence today is the most prominent and also the most problematic. The regulation 
of 3D printing is extremely piecemeal and fragmented. As one 3D designer has noted, “IP laws have 
typically lagged behind new technologies, leaving the courts to fashion old laws to situations that 
were not envisioned when they were created.”4 The different levels and methods of protection cause 
confusion and dissuade investment -  “The industry is just completely choked by intellectual property 
law right now.”5 3D printing is an area that is bringing together an increasing variety of laws, as 
opposed to simply stretching the applicability and scope of an existing area of law. Whereas the 
printing press, or online file sharing, challenged the rules concerning infringement and secondary 
liability, 3D printing poses the challenge of overlap between numerous levels of IP protection.  
 
The regulatory challenge of 3D printing matters because such technology is becoming an ever 
important element in society. 3D printing is used in the manufacture of parts in cars and planes, 
prosthetics, cells to fight cancer, and even to print food.6 Notwithstanding the technical, health and 
potential nutritional benefits that 3D printing can bring, there is no specific right that protects the 
products of 3D printing. Such regulation has, instead, been based around a number of different types 
of rights that indirectly influence the technological development of 3D printing in a random and 
piecemeal fashion.7 Even patent rights, which regulate inventions, concern only certain elements of 
                                               
3 See discussion infra p.**. 
4 Anon, ‘3D printing: Patents could make it difficult for start-ups to enter the industry’ accessible at 
http://blog.drupa.com/3d-printing-patents-could-make-it-difficult-for-start-ups-to-enter-the-industry/. 
5 Anon, ‘3D printing has stagnated, says pioneering designer Francis Bitoni’ De Zeen Magazine (25 June 2015), available 
at http://www.dezeen.com/2015/06/25/3d-printing-industry-stagnant-francis-bitonti-interview-intellectual-property-
makerbot/  
6 For discussion of application, see inter alia C Anderson, Makers: The New Industrial Revolution (Random House 
Business Books, 2012), B Berg, S van der Hof, E Kosta, 3D printing: Legal, Ethical and Economic Dimensions (The Hague: 
Springer,2016), P Li ‘3D Bioprinting Technologies: Patents, Innovation and Access, (2014) 6 Law, Innovation and 
Technology, 282; J Tran, ‘To Bioprint or not to Bioprint’, 17 North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 123 (2015)  P 
Li, S Mellor, J Griffin, C Waelde, L Hao and R Everson, ‘Intellectual Property and 3D Printing: A Case Study on 3D 
Chocolate Printing’ (2014) 9(4) JIPL&P 322. 
7 For discussion see ibid., S Bradshaw, A Bowyer, P Haufe, ‘The Intellectual Property Implications of Low-Cost 3D 
Printing’, (2010) 7:1 SCRIPTed 5 
3 
 
3D printing – e.g. if what is printed is an invention ‘as such’, and if it has not become part of the ‘state 
of the art.’8 Legal protection has often been piecemeal and operated in a number of different ways, 
and not just between different subject matters but also between different countries.  
 
A revised set of intellectual property protections could resolve the issue of overlapping and confused 
rights, whilst maintaining the system of incentives and privileges that operate under the current legal 
regime. The proposal in this paper will provide a means by which to enable a more efficacious system 
of legal protection. This will ensure that those companies who are fearful of legal protection will be 
assayed: 
 
“We need to create our own guidelines and boundaries of what is acceptable before 
legislation does if for us, we need to work as a community to define what is acceptable, and 
when it is not, how we deal with that.”9 
 
This need can be met with a harmonised right, a sui generis right which will protect 3D printed 
products as a thing in themselves. The proposed right is not one which is based on patent, copyright, 
trademark or even design rights. It is a specific, unique, right. It is not to be confused with, for 
instance, the sui generis database right which is similar to copyright.10 The proposed right is not a 
form of copyright that protects a literary technological work, nor is it a form of patent such as a utility 
right which is similar to standard patent protection with less stringent requirements and reduced 
duration. Instead this right will hold the characteristic of many types of sui generis right, which means 
that it will focus on the labour, skill and effort which is put into developing a technology.11 This 
protection when granted will override any other form of intellectual property right in that 3DP work.12 
This will remove the existing problem of conflicting intellectual property rights. To maintain the 
current balance, though, existing IPR will not be overridden. This will also ensure that there is not 
over protection or under protection that is not realised or understood by legislators working within 
the confines of their own specific specialisms. 
 
                                               
8 See discussion of patent law, infra. p**. 
9 Duann, ‘IP, 3D Printing & DMCA’ (2011) available at http://www.shapeways.com/blog/archives/747-ip,-3d-printing-
dmca.html. 
10 For the discussion of application of such a right applied to databases, see E Derclaye, The legal protection of 
databases: a comparative analysis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008); G Davies, N Caddick, & G Harbattole, Copinger 
and Skone-James on Copyright, 17th edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), Chapter 18; M Islam, ‘Should Singapore 
follow the EU in creating sui generis protection for databases?’ (2009) 4 JIPL&P 665. 
11 Discussion of the application of a sui generis right to computer software is discussed in L Diver, ‘Would the current 
ambiguities within the legal protection of software be solved by the creation of a sui generis property right for 
computer programs?’ (2008) 3 JIPL&P 125  
12 See discussion infra p.**. 
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To this end this paper will go through a number of different sections in order to make its argument. 
It will begin by assessing why, and how, it is that technology is so important to society, and then focus 
on the issue of convergence raised by 3D printing. This is to establish the rationale for the protection 
that is being proposed. It will then consider the protection that currently exists, namely in areas such 
as copyright, patents, and passing off, to see whether these different rights, merely through their 
differences, frustrate the importance of technology to society despite their possible rationales, 
namely the historical and ex-post justifications. Having done this the paper will proceed to consider 
how to regulate 3D printing. The paper will then outline how reform could be initiated. It will suggest 
what a new 3D printing right would look like, and how it would be founded in statute.  
 
The function of technology  
 
Without technology, society would not exist. The statement may sound grandiose but this is in part 
due to the broad definition which can be given to the word ‘technology.’ From the period of 
prehistory there has been a need for the existence of technology to allow for human existence. 
Mankind has always required the use of tools for hunting. This is something that Heidegger13 has 
considered in his works when he has discussed the development and use of tools in the development 
and being of mankind. In essence such technologies have become so widespread and so 
commonplace that in many instances tools could be considered to be an essential part of being 
human, e.g. in the making of art. Today, there is much consideration by academics of the importance 
of tools in the development of humanity, for instance, in human-android hybrids.14  This is why 
regulation of technology is so important because technology has become a central component of our 
being. Any impediment to the development of that technology could have grave consequences to 
the future of humankind. It is into this debate that the regulation of 3D printing comes – and it is why 
a holistic, i.e. technically informed approach to the regulation of such technology is required. 
Technological regulation is not just about maximising profit or even inventiveness or creativity per 
se, but about the future direction of society. 
 
It is therefore quite perplexing that there has been no attempt to directly regulate technology as a 
thing in itself. There have been many intersecting laws which incidentally impact technology – for 
instance, IP law is incidental. Copyright law clearly is, since this concerns the protection of publishers, 
authors or more rarely creativity, but even with patent law the emphasis is upon the scope of 
monopoly protection. There has been no regulation that squarely considers the use of technology 
within society, or even whether the use of that technology is desirable or not. We have been 
                                               
13 M Heidegger, Being and Time (1927, SUNY edition trans. J Stambaugh, New York: SUNY, 2010), 100-101. 
14 S Fuller, Humanity 2.0 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), R Braidotti, The Posthuman (Malden: Polity Press, 
2013), W Wallach and C Allen, Moral Machines, Teaching robots right from wrong (Oxford: OUP, 2009). Many of these 
ideas can be found in H Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (1964, Oxon: Routledge, 1991) 
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developing laws blindly without reference to the impacts of those laws in a meaningful way - we have 
not been considering how our laws will impact the use of technology and in turn the development of 
society. This is something that the proposed sui generis right over 3D printed products will seek to 
provide. 
 
The relationship of law and technology is one that is extremely complex and should not be 
underestimated. To begin with, law itself is a form of technology, a form of technology which has a 
simultaneous battle and co-existence between the technology of law and the technology of 
invention. Each technology is growing and developing in a way that is Darwinian15 - in the same way 
that plants will grow for light these technologies will develop through the means of replication. It 
may seem strange to characterize law in this way but law in many respects seeks to influence and 
affect the structure of that which it regulates. Law is all about replication because it is all about 
making others conform to its structure and its means of thinking. This is what underlies the whole 
approach of Habermas in his analysis of the colonisation of the human mind through legal concepts.16 
It is also what underlies even HLA Hart’s approach to law when he considers which rules are those 
that are recognised by the judiciary.17 It is what underlies the approach of law by Rawls and the notion 
of rationality.18 Although it has never been overtly characterized as a technology with Darwinian 
characteristics, those underlying characteristics have therefore been recognised throughout the 
works of those leading theorists. To this end it is therefore natural to consider the similarity between 
law and technology, and technology more generally. It is in this that we can then begin to consider 
the future of society; and more specifically, the development of a sui generis right for 3D printing. 
This is because it shows that the rules regulating 3D printing have the potential to ‘colonise’19 the 
technology and influence the way in which it not only operates, but the way in which it develops and 
the way in which it influences societal development.  
 
Concerning the issue of societal development, the utilisation of technology such as 3D printing is 
performed by people - trite but true. By the same token it is also true that law is performed by people. 
This means that the characteristics of people are as critical for technology as they are for the law. It 
is the interfacing of the people with the technology that affects the manner and success by which 
replication of the technology such as 3D printing, and indeed law, occurs. This realisation was 
                                               
15 For some discussion along these lines see M Greenberg, Comic Art, Creativity and the Law (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2014) Chapter 1. 
16 J Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action Vol II, Part VIII(2) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) 
17 H Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: OUP, 1961) at 92ff. 
18 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1972) at 142-150. For discussion of this in the context of IP see J Griffin, 
Copyright evolution - Creation, Regulation, and the Decline of Substantively Rational Copyright Law, Intellectual 
Property Quarterly [2013] 234 
19 J Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, n.16.  
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established by the work of Justice Brandeis20 and Eugen Ehrlich21 through the concept they termed 
“living law". The concept of living law is simply that people such as the judiciary would interpret laws 
in order to keep them current and relevant for the general population. By the same token, 
technologies have kept their relevance and their rationality – being utilised by coders and users alike 
whereby code becomes a form of regulation that is to be followed or to be broken.22 Digital Rights 
Management loses its rationality by either being too strict with regard to actions performed by users, 
or by permitting the breach of its protections. It can be observed that the law, and technology, was 
influenced and developed in a way that impacted their respective replicability within the other. The 
characteristics of the people were brought into the law and technologies including their likes and 
dislikes and so forth. When considering the relationship of law and technology, we should therefore 
be careful to call to mind the purposes of the people who the law regulates and the people who use 
the technology. A specific right for 3D printing should not become completely divorced from either 
aspect – the technology should not become an end in itself, but instead it should be central to the 
right to consider what the purpose of the regulation should be. This purpose is reasonably self-
evident – it is the continued development of society. As to what that precisely means – well, this is 
something that the proposed system should enable discussion of.  A system that is correctly 
structured and attuned to what it regulates, in this instance technology, should operate in a way that 
permits the aims of the regulation to be easily modified. This is not something which has been seen 
with current IP laws, where regulation is often based around implicit ex-post justifications.23 This 
makes amendment of the law, both in statute and through case law, slow and difficult to achieve. 
When dealing with technologies which are changing rapidly, it is easy to see why it is that economic 
reasoning in IP cases, and also by legislators, has become common place. Economics provides a 
‘traditional’ regulatory handle by which to achieve change.24 However, this economic approach falls 
short because such economic based reasoning is merely a means by which to interpret events rather 
than an end in itself. If regulation is to be effective, then it should work towards a regulatory aim that 
is capable of explicit discussion, i.e. to ensure that regulation is consistent with the technology that 
is being regulated; to spur innovation, or creativity.  
 
The challenge of 3D printing 
 
                                               
20 L Brandeis, The Living Law (1916) 10 Illinois Law Review 461  
21 E Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1936, New York: Russel and Russel, 1962). 
22 Consider the link to the discussion about architecture (in its broadest sense) in L Lessig, Code (New York: Basic Books, 
1999) throughout and Appendix 1. 
23 See for example Gyles v Wilcox Barn C 368 (1741), Millar v Taylor (1768) 98 Eng Rep 201.and The Hansard Report of 
Donaldson v Beckett , reported as ’Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property’, 14 Geo III 1st Ser. 17 
950 (1774)- (although these ex post justifications do become embedded within the law over time; however, the lack of 
more than a handful of explicit references back remain there is a distinction between the original ex post justifications 
and the development of case law) 
24 See infra p.**. 
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Whilst 3D printing poses enormous challenges to the traditional modes of production,25 in particular 
customised production,26 the main challenge, it is argued, that 3D printing poses to regulation is that 
it could encourage mass scale piracy through the copying of files, and also through the 3D scanning 
of existing objects (a ‘Napsterisation’ of the physical).27 It is argued that this is difficult to guard 
against because of the piecemeal IP system whereby many types of IP can be used to protect the 
content, but with no particular system being the ‘go to’ one to bring legal actions of infringement. 
Should an action for infringement of a plastic doll, for instance, be brought through copyright, patent, 
trade marks or the various levels of design protection? How would a threat to initiate legal proceeding 
be handled, bearing in mind different rules exist for copyrights, designs, trade marks and patents?28 
These challenges are complex, but it is suggested that trying to create a complex web of rules to 
govern application of the existing law is not desirable due to the complexity involved. Rather than 
simply dealing with the regulatory challenges reactively, this paper suggests that an approach should 
be used which is more proactive, which focuses upon the function of technology within society and 
seeks to identify where 3D printing fits within this narrative. Any sui generis right for 3D printing 
should, ideally, be consistent with that function (or at least provide an ontologically correct means 
by which to challenge it). 
 
As noted above, 3D printing is currently protected by a large number of intellectual property rights. 
The justification of these intellectual property rights has been most varied, with ex post justifications 
for IP being particularly predominant. The justifications stem from protecting individual property to 
                                               
25 n. 6 above. See also C Doctorow, Makers (London: Harper, 2009) (a fictional story which raises key issues), I 
Silverman, Optimising Protection: IP Rights in 3D printing (2016) 38 EIPR 5, RM Ballardini, M Norrgard and T Minssen, 
Enforcing Patents in the era of 3D printing (2015) 10 JIPL&P 850; P Twomey, A new dimension to intellectual property 
infringement: an evaluation of the intellectual property issues associated with 3D printing (2014) 17 Trinity College Law 
Review 14, S Bradshaw, 3D printing update, (2013) 24 Computers and Law 31, L. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional 
Printing: The Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms (2014) 51 San Diego L. Rev. 553, J Hornick, 3D Printing and the 
elephant in the room, 55 Santa Clara Law Review 801 (2015); A Lewis, The Legality of 3D Printing: How the technology 
is moving faster than the law (2014)17 Tulane Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 303; P Viscounty, A Gass, 
K Virgien, 3d printing: A new technology challenges the existing intellectual property framework, (2014) 56 Orange 
County Law  16; R Sedhom, 3D printing and its effect on the fashion industry, (2015) 55 Santa Clara Law Review 865. 
See also the projects funded by the EPSRC via Cambridge University (S. Ford) concerning 3D printing and redistributed 
manufacturing - https://capturingthevalue.wordpress.com/2016/01/15/3dp-rdm-feasibility-studies-call-for-proposals-
2016/  
26 E Kennedy and A Giampetro-Meyer, Gearing up for the next industrial revolution: 3D printing, home based factories , 
and modes of social control (2015) 46 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 955, B Depoorter, Intellectual Property 
infringements & 3d printing: Decentralized piracy, (2014) 63 Hastings Law Journal 1483, S Peacock, Why manufacturing 
matters: 3d printing, computer aided designs, and the rise of end-user patent infringement (2014) 55 William and Mary 
Law Review 1933. 
27 D Desai and G Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things (2014) 102 Georgetown 
Law Journal 1691 
28 For details see J Griffin and A Nair, Scientia potentia est: Making threats of copyright infringement, 27 International 
Review of Law Computers and Technology 280 (2013).See s.21 TMA 1994, s70 PA 1977, s.253 CDPA 1988, s.26 RDA 
1949; M Anderson, Threats provisions: time to abolish them? IP Draughts (2011) available at http:// 
ipdraughts.wordpress.com/2011/05/26/ip-threats-provisions-time-to-abolish-them/. 
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encouraging creativity. There has been much written about what is the most appropriate justification. 
However, what is common to these different approaches is that they are all based around, in some 
form, a lack of efficient and ordered regulation. Lockean labour theory, where the labour of the 
individual on the commons, is, when applied directly or indirectly through law, a way of remedying 
market defects – IP grants a right to reward the labour of a creator when such reward might otherwise 
not be forthcoming.29 Personality theories of the type discussed by Hegel30 and Kant,31 when applied 
through law, are also an attempt to justify a system which otherwise would not be protecting the 
personal interests of the author. The proposed sui generis right seeks to deal with this issue of a lack 
of efficiency and lack of ordered regulation. However, it goes further in achieving this by considering 
the importance and function of technology to society more generally. Thus, rather than remedying a 
defect, or inefficiency per se, the proposed system is seeking to achieve the creation of regulation 
which is efficient in and of itself, because of the regulatory structure. By focusing on the importance 
of technology to society itself, and encouraging those key aspects, rather than seeking to remedy 
defects within the present system, it is believed efficiencies will be gained and that the regulation will 
be more efficacious. 
 
Regulation of 3D printing 
 
With the above in mind the task becomes one of assessing the nature of how the technologies of law 
have thus far influenced the development of technology more generally. As suggested above the 
importance of not just lawmakers, but also those who apply the law, are central as well as the 
subsequent use of the law and technology by individuals. What is assessed is the regulation of 
technology and what that has achieved in terms of the development of that technology, to consider 
how law has or has not enabled certain technological directions, and why that has occurred.  
 
In relation to 3D printing, much of the existing literature has provided overview of the relationship of 
3D printing with the current law.32 For instance, central articles in the 3D printing regulatory field are 
                                               
29 J Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (1690, New York: Dover, 2002 ) Chapter V. See also discussion in S 
Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Property in S Munzer (ed), New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of 
Property, 138 (Cambridge: CUP, 2001) about application to IP law. See also J Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property (1988)  77 Georgetown Law Journal 287 and W Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in S Munzer, 168. 
30 G Hegel, Philosophy of Right (1821, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996). 
31 I Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785, London: Routledge, 1991) and I Kant, The Metaphysic of 
Morals (1797, Cambridge: CUP, 1996). 
32 Infra n.6 
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those by Mendis,33 as well as another by Bradshaw et al,34 who have focused upon establishing a 
groundwork of what the technology is and the application of the law to that technology, rather than 
taking a broader approach to the nature of technology and society. This paper argues that it is 
necessary to consider the relationship between law and all technologies, not just 3D printing, if 
regulation of 3D printing is to be effective. A holistic approach is key,35 i.e. it is not possible to simply 
select one technology and treat it as an independent and separate case, because the development 
of one technology invariably feeds into a future technology. This is the underlying philosophy behind 
this paper. 
 
With this holistic approach in mind it is suggested that we also need a similarly holistic approach 
towards an analysis of the law and that it should not therefore be undertaken in relation to single 
areas such as databases, patents, trademarks, or copyright, but instead be a complete view of all 
types of regulation. This means drawing similarities from the case law and literature to establish what 
it is that links together all of these different types of legal protection. Do they all draw upon similar 
starting points or do they have different and completely conflicting rationales? This paper will see 
what similarities exist within the current case law in order to draw similarities, and assess how it is 
that technology has thus far avoided being protected under a single particular right. With 3D printing, 
it is possible for rights to co-exist and also conflict. For instance, patent law focuses on the invention 
aspect whereas copyright focuses more on the ‘cultural’ or ‘artistic work’ aspect. There are 
boundaries between the two, so for instance patents will generally not override copyright. 36 
However, some rights more overtly ride alongside posing what is likely to seem an irrational conflict 
in the eyes of the consumer, for instance, the complex relationship between copyright, unregistered 
and registered designs. 37  The confusion that results from these boundaries are sometimes 
overlooked by the legislators themselves: for instance, the UK-IPO report on 3D printing emphasised 
the function of copyright, to the detriment of the consideration of other types of IP.38 Other types of 
IP could include designs, patents or trademarks, both of which can be more easily infringed with 3D 
                                               
33 D Mendis, "Clone wars" episode II - the next generation: the copyright implications relating to 3D printing and 
computer-aided design (CAD) files, (2014) 6 Law, Innovation and Technology 265; D Mendis, “The clone wars": episode 
1 - the rise of 3D printing and its implications for intellectual property law - learning lessons from the past? (2013) 35 
EIPR 155. For an equivalent approach in a Canadian article, see M Rimock, ‘An Introduction to the Intellectual Property 
Law Implications of 3D Printing’, (2013) 13 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 1  
34 S Bradshaw, A Bowyer, P Haufe, ‘The Intellectual Property Implications of Low-Cost 3D Printing’, (2010) 7:1 SCRIPTed 
5 
35 An example of an holistic approach can be found in P Li, 3D Bioprinting Technologies: Patents, Innovation and Access 
6 Law, Innovation, Technology 282 (2014) at 299. 
36 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2010] EWHC 1829 (Ch), para.205-207.  
37 Note recent amendments to s.51/52, infra p.***. 
38 UK-IPO, A Legal and Empirical Study into the Intellectual Property Implications of 3D printing available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/421543/A_Legal_and_Empirical_Stud
y_into_the_Intellectual_Property_Implications_of_3D_Printing_-_Exec_Summary_-_Web.pdf . For comments, see 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2015/05/3d-printing-and-law-three-recent_31.html  
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printing than with proceeding technologies. For example, a 3D print is a physical object that can be 
more in the nature of a patentable invention than a copyright work.39 A trade mark, such as a shape 
mark, could be reproduced with a 3D scanner and 3D printer. The lack of consideration of broader IP 
types is a direct consequence of the law not considering the overall functions and possibilities of 
technologies such as 3DP. The underlying possibilities of the technology are being overlooked, to e.g. 
make 3D printing fit within the existing legal category of copyright. This approach needs to change 
with increasing technological and legal convergence.  
 
What is it within these laws that could be identified, in order to bring together the very many 
disparate approaches that govern the underlying regulation of technology? The answer is reasonably 
straightforward – labour, skill and expense. This is the key favoured characteristic of the current legal 
system perceived as advantageous by 3D printing companies: 
 
 “We invested early in turning our novel ideas into patents. It was a learning experience and it 
took a long time to understand the patent system. It’s actually a pretty cool thing for an 
innovator to see his or her name on a patent and at MakerBot. We credit the individuals who 
come up with inventions within the company.”40 
 
As will be discussed below, this has been a core tenet in copyright law subsistence as expressed in 
that form, but it will be suggested that it is also the underlying rationale for most other forms of IP as 
well – even those not so explicitly expressed. However, the conflicting outcomes of the different 
types of IP undermine the protection given to that aim. The financial investment into a creative 
cultural work, an invention, logo, or design appears to be of particular importance, but the outcome 
of that protection can vary with 3D printed products despite the product being one and the same. As 
noted above, for instance, a 3D printed product (say a device for holding an object) could be 
protected by copyright, patents, trade marks, designs and the other rights identified elsewhere for 
substantially the same item, i.e. the code, invention, shape and function of the object. 41   The 
relevance of this to the broader holistic approach for a sui generis 3D printing right is that it is possible 
to assess to what degree this focus on labour has had an impact upon the development of 
technologies, and whether the division of IP into a large number of conflicting categories potentially 
undermines this holistic view.  
 
The current focus of the law upon labour, skill and expense is reflective of the relationship between 
the individual and the law, as discussed earlier. Labour has long been a concept that in the minds of 
                                               
39 See, for example, multi print designs available on https://www.thingiverse.com/  
40 Anon, Stratsys Lawsuit, Patents and More at https://makezine.com/2013/12/03/stratasys-lawsuit-patents-and-more-
an-interview-with-makerbots-bre-pettis/. 
41 See infra p.***. 
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the populace is something worthy of reward – this was an integral element within the protestant 
work ethic, a term coined by Weber.42 Ultimately, through religious influence and State influence, 
labour became embedded within the minds of the individual citizens. This was reinforced43 by the 
growth of capitalism and property ownership which also was taking place. By this route, labour has 
become of critical importance, and it can be seen how labour has therefore become enshrined as a 
concept within IP law in almost autopoetic fashion.44 The ‘power’ of law to govern IP, taken in the 
Foucaultian sense,45 is therefore dispersed and spread out among the different types of IP, in the 
form of labour – and this concept comes from both the wider citizenry and the regulators. Likewise, 
this norm has consequently also fed into the technologies themselves. “File sharing”, where 
individuals copy files over online peer to peer networks,46 has led to accusations of piracy47 by right 
holders who claim their labour is being, essentially, misappropriated; meanwhile, many users cry foul 
because of the labour and effort put into cracking networks and distributing altered versions. If labour 
does not feature within the technology in some form, then that technology may very well not 
succeed.48 Labour is engrained within society as a central concept. So, where do these themes of 
labour, skill and expense reside within our legal system of IP, and how does this reflect the proposed 
holistic view of IP for the introduction of a sui generis right for 3D printing? 
 
Themes for protection of 3D printed products  
 
The technology that is involved in making 3D printed products covers aspects such as the 
programming code included within a file, the shown product in 3D on a computer, tablet or phone 
screen, and the final printed products. 49  Many 3D files are kept within the STL file format, which is a 
format that contains the main printing points on X, Y and Z axis.50 Under current legal protection, this 
poses a challenge for copyright law due to the fact that the basic file format is little more than an 
unarguable algorithm. Such works might not be copyrightable, although if the final product meets 
the subsistence requirements of originality then it might be protectable, perhaps as a literary work – 
                                               
42 M Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905, London: Harper Collins, 1930). 
43 Consider the relationship with the “invisible hand” – e.g. A Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776).  
44 N Luhmann, Social Systems (California: Stanford University Press, 1995) and G Teubner, A Gebbrajo, State, Law, and 
Economy as Autopoietic Systems (Dott. A. Giuffre editore, 1992). 
45 M Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol 1 (1978, trans. Random House, 1978, London: Penguin, 1998) Part 4, Chapter 
2, and M Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in J Faubion, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (London: Penguin, 2002), 
201-223. 
46 See e.g. W Fisher, Promises to Keep (Stanford: Stanford Law and Politics, 2004). 
47 On which see discussion in A Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2009) 
48 See infra p.***. 
49 The importance in this distinction, as well as ‘levels’ discussed infra, p.***, is discussed in T Rayna, L Striukova, & J 
Darlington, Open-Innovation, Co-creation and Mass Customisation: What role for 3D printing platforms? In Proceedings 
of the 7th World Conference on Mass Customization, Personalization, and Co-Creation (MCPC 2014), Aalborg, Denmark, 
February 4th - 7th, 2014  available at http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-04271-8  
50 For details see ‘The STL file format’ available at http://www.fabbers.com/tech/STL_Format  
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although there is no clear precedence on this point. However, the STL file is not the ‘be all and end 
all’ of file formats for 3D printing; it happens to be the file format that is commonly used for printing 
files. Other file formats exist which have the potential to be more descriptive and thus, where STL file 
format files alone may fail for protection, files with different, more descriptive,51 file formats might 
be able to obtain protection. 3D printing has additional complications in this regard, as 3D printers 
require their own file formats to enable printing. 
 
The product as shown on a digital, i.e. computer, screen presents more complex challenges. There is 
the potential copyright in the design, the specific design rights, trade marks and patents. 52 
Furthermore, there may be complications over the ownership of what constitutes the IP, if the 
computer is responsible for the operation of the product within a 3D environment. For example, if a 
computer program such as Blender53 allows a file to perform something that would otherwise be a 
patentable invention, then it may not be clear what the work or invention is per se for patent 
purposes. Blender or the other supporting software may cause the inventive operation. An example 
would be if a 3D printing file contains a 3D object in software form that allows for a specific type of 
operation such as exclusion carried out by other software processes.  Furthermore, any 3D printed 
file may require skeinforge,54 part of which provides a complex set of supports to enable the most 
common form of 3D printing to take place. This may also add in a further factor to complicate what 
is a work, or what is an invention, since it is an integral element of most 3D printed files to enable 
their printing. 
 
Once an object has been printed, then it might be argued that there is little difference between that 
3D printed object and any other object. However, there can be code embedded in that object - there 
is potential for digital watermarking55 that would operate as part of the “Internet of Things.”56 It 
could be possible to embed a code, such as a barcode, into a 3D printed file, which will then be 
detected in photographs of the object.57 These codes could be searched for by right holders using 
                                               
51 Descriptive in the sense of providing detailed information about the file, and hence copyrightable. 
52 The “as such” criteria is within the exceptions for patent protection in the UK – see the Patents Act 1977 s.1(2). 
53 See https://www.blender.org/  
54 See http://reprap.org/wiki/Skeinforge  and http://fabmetheus.crsndoo.com/overview.php  
55 See A Macq and P Alface, 3D robust blind watermarking, available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/sirris_be/applicability-oftracabilitytechnologiesfor3-dprintingrobustblindwatermarkingucl 
and B Yeo and M Yeung, Watermarking 3D objects for verification, (1999) 19 IEEE Journal 36  available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a390872.pdf  
56 ITU, ‘Internet of Things Global Standards Initiative’ available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
T/gsi/iot/Pages/default.aspx; J Gubbi, R Buyya, S Marusic, M Palaniswami, ‘A Internet of Things (IoT): A vision, 
architectural elements, and future directions’ 29 Future Generation Computer Systems 1645 (2013); E Fleisch, ‘What is 
the Internet of things?’ Auto-ID Labs White Paper WP-BIZAPP-053 (2010) available at 
http://cocoa.ethz.ch/media/documents/2014/06/archive/AUTOIDLABS-WP-BIZAPP-53.pdf. 
57 These could be reverse engineered by methods of obfuscation could be employed to make their removal from the file 
extremely difficult, i.e. by placing algorithmic code within low level STL XYZ file data. 
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computer programs. Likewise, software code could be embedded into a 3D printed file that, if it is 
subsequently scanned in, will execute when stored in a computer system to reveal to the right holder 
that the file has been copied. 3D printing will likely as not encourage these trends, as individuals seek 
to trace the use of their products, either for interest, to reclaim royalties, or begin infringement 
proceedings – if individuals wish to gain financial reward, by default, as an individual, they will be 
likely to be producing fewer products than a traditional factory and are therefore likely to have a 
greater stake in the enforcement of IP in the products that they create.58   
 
Having considered the nuanced issues that 3D printing poses, this paper will consider the relationship 
between the above 3D printed products, and the rationale given for protecting them under current 
regulation. As already indicated, labour is of particular importance within the existing IP laws, and 
the basis for this has come about via two main routes. These are the routes of historical explanation 
and ex post justification. There is some overlap, which will be explained below, as on occasions ex 
post justifications have been used to support certain case judgments.   
 
The role of ‘labour’ within the justifications for IP 
 
It has already been outlined above, when discussing the relationship between the regulators and 
citizenry, that the protestant work ethic is one key reason for the existence of labour within the minds 
of the citizenry, and one of the reasons why labour has become so central within the case law. 
However, there are other historical factors that can be used to explain the rise of the notion of labour 
that are more directly related to IP. Perhaps one of the most important is the function of property, 
which initially provided a means by which individuals could become involved in a ‘democracy’ – 
important, since democracy was not so common place in the past.59 Property rights were widely 
regarded as inalienable, and a means by which an individual could express their wealth and relations 
to others, including the Crown. IP, though not formally a property right until much later, 60 
nonetheless had many of the characteristics of property, in that it could be sold and licensed. In this 
way, the notion of labour became imbued within IP law because the labour involved in making a work 
could lead to the creation of such intangible properties. There is also another analogous way in which 
labour became enshrined in the IP context. Whereas today 3D printing promises to place rights in the 
                                               
58 Results of AHRC, Newton Fund and NSTB funded empirical interviews in China by the author demonstrate beyond 
that a number of 3DP creators are keen to trace product use. For the results, see Chan, Choo, Osuji, Griffin (eds), 3D 
Printing in China (Routledge, 2018). 
59 Note the relation of this to the general thesis of M Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (1947, 
trans Parsons, New York: Free Press, 1964) and M Weber, Economy and Society (multiple trans., ed. G Roth & C Wittich, 
University of California Press, 1978) esp. Vol 1 Pt 1 Ch IV, and generally M Weber, The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of 
Capitalism n.42 above. 
60 Copyright –first mention in s1(1), s.90, s.93B CDPA 1988; first mention for patents, s.7(2) s.30-s.38 ‘Property in 
patents and applications, and registration’ Patents Act 1977; first mention for trade marks, s.2(1), s.22 Trade Marks Act 
1994.   
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hands of (labouring) individual content creators rather than manufacturers, in the past it was also 
control over technology that led to control over the exploitation of IP. Booksellers, and publishers, 
were powerful in relation to literary works because of difficulties in getting works printed and 
distributed. It gave the (labouring) booksellers and publishers greater bargaining power and control 
over how works were created and distributed. Furthermore, those booksellers and publishers, when 
the printing press was invented,61 were acting in a way that removed control from the State to them. 
3D printing is similar – involving labour through the technology – in particular, the labour of creating 
and printing. This labour involves financial investment in the technology, and technological skill and 
scarcity also plays a role. Consequently, IP also has specific reasons why labour has become important 
in terms of its history. 
 
The theoretical justifications that have been explicitly invoked within case law have also tended to 
revolve around labour, whether explicitly or implicitly. It is important to note that they tend to be ex-
post theories, namely, ‘after the event.’ They are numerous, examples include Lockean labour theory 
(naturally enough!) and his knowledge theory, Kantian and Hegelian notions of personality, 62 
Benthamite utilitarianism, 63  through to modern day justifications such as optimal economic 
rationalisation.64 All of these, it is submitted, utilise a degree of technological skill and expense which 
is characterised by labour.65 With Lockean labour theory,66 the importance of labour is self-evident, 
and it typically arises in relation to labour that is put upon something that had previously been held 
within a physical commons. With knowledge theory67 it is insofar as knowledge production requires 
skill and is according to Locke enhanced through memory which again implies a degree of mental 
labour (particularly so since Locke’s work also implies that technology can assist with this). 68 
Observation of the world around us is also enhanced by technology and labour. So, ultimately, Locke’s 
justifications are all assisted by labour, and invariably that labour can be achieved more efficiently 
through technology.  
                                               
61 Moveable type – Gutenberg press, 1440-1450; Caxton Press, as used in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales (1843) McMurtrie, 
The Book: The Story of Printing and Bookmaking (Oxford: OUP, 1943) Chapter X and Chapter XIV. 
62 I Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785) and I Kant, The Metaphysic of Morals (1797) n31. G Hegel, 
Philosophy of Right (1821) n.30. 
63 J Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789, 1823 edition, Oxford: OUP, 1907). 
64 See n.72, n.73.  
65 For discussion of the application of labour theory to IP see discussion in S. Shiffrin, ‘Lockean Arguments for Private 
Intellectual Property’ in S Munzer (ed), New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property n.29; see also J. Hughes, 
‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988) 77 Georgetown Law Journal 287.  
66 J Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Chapter V (1690) n. 29 above. 
67 J Locke, Essay on Human Understanding (1690, London: William Tegg, 1880). See also J Gibson, Locke’s Theory of 
Knowledge (Cambridge: CUP, 1931). 
68 ”..the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the 
intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call ‘intuitive knowledge’…quickness in the mind to find out these 
intermediate ideas (that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other), and to apply them right, is, I 
suppose, that which is called ‘sagacity’… a steady application of pursuit is required to this discovery…” J Locke, Essay on 
Human Understanding, ibid., Book IV, Chapter II, Section 1, 2 and 4. 
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Personality theories concern the manner in which a person develops by expressing their will upon 
physical objects.69  Labour, although not cited as a central component, is once again of central 
importance since it has to be used by an individual to be able to create physical change. Once more, 
technology is particularly relevant because technology is what enables individuals to be able to have 
an impact upon the world that is around them. A person can take a block of marble and labour upon 
that effectively and efficiently with the appropriate technologies; likewise, an individual may do so 
through the use of 3D printing. Again, the issue of skills also particularly relevant in the use of 
technologies to see that they are used as effectively as possible.  
 
Finally, the last traditional, long standing, ex post theory is that of utilitarianism – the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number.70 On the face of it, labour is of less importance here – something 
does not require labour per se if it is to help achieve an optimal level of happiness. However, a 
moment’s consideration will reveal that there is labour involved – for instance, the most efficient and 
optimal methods by which to achieve this happiness is likely to involve labour i.e. in the creation or 
processes of dissemination of cultural works, or even just travelling to view them. The balance the 
happiness of the greatest number of people could arguably be more likely achieved through fine-
scale, finely grained, technologies which can utilise a large quantity of small information about 
individuals. An example of that would be licensing systems on the Internet for copyright content that 
can lead to more nuanced balancing in terms of ensuring that as much content is available to the 
public versus reward for the right holder. A current system operating in this way is, where they 
operate, the automatic identification and watermarking systems on Youtube. 71  Ultimately, 
technology is extremely important in facilitating utilitarianism, and thus the labour involved in 
creating and maintaining that technology. In a very similar vein, economic theories, such as those 
espoused by Landes and Posner,72 or Merges and Nelson,73 often base themselves around a degree 
of utilitarianism in the sense that they seek to achieve an optimal level of protection for IP. Again, 
labour features in a manner similar to utilitarianism, in the sense that it is required to achieve the 
application of the theories, but also in the sense that labour is present as part of the calculations. 
 
All of these justifications which in one way or another feature protection of labour have, over time, 
featured within IP law. For instance, the labour theory has been critical in the development of the 
                                               
69 “A person must give to his freedom an external sphere, in order that he may reach the completeness implied in the 
idea. Since a person is as yet the first abstract phase of the completely existent, infinite will, the external sphere of 
freedom is not only distinguishable from him but directly different and separable” G Hegel, Philosophy of Right, n.30 
above at 41. 
70 J Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) n.63 above. 
71 Anon, ‘Copyright on Youtube’ at https://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/en-GB/  
72 W Landes and R Posner, An economic analysis of copyright law, 18 Journal of Legal Studies 325 (1989); 
73 R Merges and R Nelson, On the complex economics of Patent Scope, 90 Columbia Law Review 839 (1990).   
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originality tests for copyright and the subsistence tests for patents; the knowledge theory has 
featured to a lesser degree but was repeated in Donaldson v Beckett (1774) by Lord Camden.74 
Personality can be seen within moral rights and, again, patents in the sense that an invention is an 
expression of the individual; utilitarianism can be identified within case law generally but in particular 
US law where it has featured within the US constitution due to the involvement of Bentham in its 
drafting: 
 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”75 
 
Meanwhile the use of economic reasoning has been particularly predominant within recent case law, 
where the economic impact of judgments is often considered – economic impact in terms of financial 
investment, or what could be termed financial labour. The below example provides a very clear quote 
and is from the US; equally clear examples may be found in the UK though:76 
 
“The movie studios were reluctant to release movies in digital form until they were confident 
they had in place adequate safeguards against piracy of their copyrighted movies… In 1998, the 
studios secured added protection against DVD piracy when Congress passed the DMCA, which 
prohibits the development or use of technology designed to circumvent a technological 
protection measure, such as CSS.”77 
So, to conclude, labour has been something of critical importance to IP law – namely, labour to obtain 
property. In this regard, one may surmise that within society, labour has become the cornerstone 
upon which any proposed sui generis right should sit. To this end, the paper will now proceed to 
question the case law to assess two things a) what the nature of labour is within those cases, and b) 
whether there is a conflict in the type of labour that is identified between the different rights, and 
whether there is a difference of approach that is likely to lead to confusion. It will be argued that 
there is confusion, and that this is why there is a need for a single overriding sui generis right for 3D 
printing.  
 
 
Establishing a new sui generis right 
 
                                               
74 The Hansard Report of Donaldson v Beckett, reported as ’Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary 
Property’, 14 Geo III 1st Ser. 17 950 (1774) at 999 above n.23. 
75 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 US Constitution. (See E Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause 
(William Hein, 2002)). 
76 Designers Guild v Williams [2000] 1 WLR 2416. 
77 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273 F.3d 429, 436 (US, 2d Cir. 2001). 
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It has already been argued above that the 3D printing right to cover 3D printed products should be 
sui generis in nature. It would be a singular right which would be based around the investment and 
technological skill involved. In this sense it could be quite similar to the sui generis right in 
databases. 78  That particular right, in effect, looks at the skill, investment and arrangement of 
information in databases – if there is sufficient of those elements present within the database, it will 
obtain the sui generis protection over those elements.79 It was created through European Union 
legislation namely the Database Directive of 1996.80 The right had a number of shortcomings which 
led to its eventual limitation through case law, in particular the ECJ (as it then was) case of William 
Hill.81 The issue with the right was that initially some of the criteria were not yet particularly well 
known or understood by domestic courts.82 As a result of this, there was a fear that the Database 
right would become too broad. If the right were to be read broadly, then the sui generis right could 
have covered all the contents of a database, thus potentially rendering other IP rights (e.g. copyright) 
irrelevant since they would have offered less protection.83 It was this fear that the then ECJ in William 
Hill confronted directly,84  but the different terminology and terms used still posed an issue for 
implementing courts. For example, issues remained over the scope of words such as “investment” in 
a database, which refers to the investment in the selection and arrangement of the data rather than 
the underlying data itself.85  
 
To ensure familiarity with the proposed sui generis right, it is suggested that the right should be based 
around existing principles of labour, skill and expense from copyright law.86 This is not to imply a 
copyright bias- as outlined in the previous section, these principles are similar to those present within 
other areas of IP but are simply more explicitly acknowledged within copyright law. By the utilisation 
of these existing well-known principles courts and legislators will therefore not be so disinclined to 
                                               
78 For a parallel debate see M Islam, Should Singapore follow the EU in creating sui generis protection for databases?, 
n.10 above. 
79 “Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows that there has been qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to 
prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively, of the contents of that database.” Article 7(1) Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases OJL 77, 27/03/1996.  
80 Directive 96/9/EC, ibid. For details see E Derclaye, The legal protection of databases: a comparative analysis, infra 
n.10. 
81 C-203/02 British Horseracing Board v William Hill [2005] ECDR 1 
82 See e.g., C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forenung [2009] ECDR 
83 E.g. Nauta Dutilh, Study Contract for the European Commission, ETD/2001/B5-
3001/E/72http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/etd2001b53001e72_en.pdf 
84 C-203/02 British Horseracing Board, infra n.81 para 97. 
85 C Colston, ‘Protecting Databases – A Call for Regulation’ 19 Denning Law Journal 86 (2007) at 99. See William Hill, n. 
81, and Colston citing Netherland case NVM v De Telegraaf (President District Court of the Hague 12 September 2000) 
[2001] Mediaforum 87 and German case Paper Boy (German Federal Court of Justice, 17 July 2003) I ZR 259/00. For 
subsequent confusion see C-338/02 Fixtures Marketing v Svenska [2004] All ER (D) 150 and the Advocate General 
Opinion. 
86 See infra p.***. 
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utilise the right. Furthermore, it is suggested that the sui generis right will be one that overrides all 
existing rights in that work thereby removing one of the main causes of confusion (different levels of 
legal protection) that currently exists. As noted above the right can be utilised in the same sort of 
way as if copyright has been utilised. As for infringement between the granted sui generis 3D printing 
rights themselves, it is suggested that a test from copyright law be utilised. As argued by Chacksfield 
in The Hedgehog and the Fox,87 under copyright law in the UK if a work was capable of obtaining 
copyright protection then it was arguable that it would not be possible for it to be deemed infringing 
of an existing right – as per Lord Hoffmann in Designers Guild.88 This is because the new work would 
have been sufficiently original. In the context of the proposed sui generis right this could be utilised 
to mean that if a work has sufficient skill, labour and effort then it should be far enough advanced in 
terms of existing rights so as not to infringe them.   
 
So with this baseline established for the relationship between the proposed sui generis right and the 
existing rights of intellectual property, and between the proposed rights themselves, along with 
greater certainty than that present in the sui generis database right, it is now possible to move on 
and look at how the right will operate in practice. As identified earlier,89 the main issue that has 
occurred with 3D printing is that there is no single area of law that creators or users can turn to in 
order to easily establish what potential rights and liabilities are. The creation of the sui generis right 
is seeking to deal with this by creating one single set of rules to which everybody can turn. It also 
removes the uncertainty inherent in a bundle of rights where key rationale, such as the protection of 
labour, differs considerably from one set of law to the next. Individuals and businesses cannot easily 
identify even what types of protection exist and over what elements. So how would the proposed sui 
generis right work? Two distinct examples can be given, one where the work is original and another 
where the work is not original. 
  
(a) The proposed system where there is an ‘original 3DP work’ 
 
In relation to an original work, for instance a 3D printed work of art that has been made entirely by 
the same author as the author of the 3D printed file, the existence of the sui generis right is easy to 
establish. There would be a test of whether there has been a sufficient degree of labour, skill and 
effort in the 3D printed products,90 namely the file itself and the final creation. They would be kept 
separate since, otherwise, protection could become limited by the actions of the 3D printer 
contributing to the final product. The notion of labour could be adapted from the copyright notion 
                                               
87 M Chacksfield, ‘The Hedgehog and the Fox, a Substantial Part of the Law of Copyright’, [2001] EIPR 259 
88 Designers Guild Ltd. v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2000] n. 76 at 2418-2426. 
89 Infra p.***. 
90 The use of the phrase ‘products’ is deliberate, to distinguish it from a copyright ‘work.’ 
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of labour, such as that found in Walter v Lane.91 In this case, heard in 1900, copyright protection 
was given to a report of a speech that was printed in The Times. A number of reasons for protection 
were given – “labour, skill, and capital”;92 “skill, labour, and expense”93; “intellectual skill and brain 
labour.”94 This paper suggests that given subsequent case law, this could be summarised as “skill, 
labour and effort.”95 The final standard would be aimed at preventing individuals from gaining 
protection over mere copies or copies with low levels of originality thus raising the spectre of quick 
profit making by cheap copies. As with copyright law, though, protection would still allow for 
independent creation to be permitted. A provision could be worded as follows: 
 
“There will be a sui generis right to protect against the unauthorised taking of a substantial 
part of labour, skill and effort in registered 3D printed works. This right will override any other 
existing IP rights in that same work.” 
 
Protection would arise with registration, with an organisation such as the UK-IPO. Registration could 
be linked to a Copyright Hub identifier on the file itself96 or on the final 3D printed product. The 
identifier can be made obvious in the same way as a Creative Commons label or a CLA logo.97 
Protection would run from the date of first distribution (i.e. by demonstrating the date that the file 
was first shared online). Duration is an issue not thus far discussed but it would be for a lesser period 
than copyright owing to the nature of products. There are many issues with 3D printing that could 
lead to protection being granted that is overbroad. The current duration of IP protection over 3D 
printed products is extremely varied, depending both on the type of IP and the type of, e.g., copyright 
work, and varies from durations such as life of the author plus 70 years for copyright in a literary or 
artistic work, to 20 years from the date of filing for a patent. It is suggested, as a means of obtaining 
support from potential right holders, that protection last for a period roughly in the middle of current 
protections, which, if we assume copyright and patents are the main levels of protection relevant for 
3D printing, could be 70 years from the date of distribution.98 As detailed below, it is argued that 
duration can be amended according to the potential broadness of the protection over the 3D printed 
content.99 This may appear disproportionately long. However, protection exists only over the aspects 
of the product where there is sufficient labour, skill and effort. More importantly, in practice, because 
                                               
91 Walter v Lane [1900] A.C. 539. 
92 Walter v Lane, ibid., Lord Halsbury at 545. 
93 Walter v Lane, ibid., Lord Davy at 551. 
94 Walter v Lane, ibid., Lord Brampton at 556 
95 See e.g. Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2000] n. 76 at para.2. 
96 This system is now operational see http://themoca.co.uk/events/moca-copyright-hub-event/ . 
97 http://www.cla.co.uk/ ; for details see http://whatcanidowiththiscontent.com/  
98 This is based on the focus of the literature about 3D printing, conferences attended, conversations with right holders 
and empirical research carried out by the author. 
99 See infra p. **. 
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of the growth of online licensing systems such as that proposed by the UK Copyright Hub100 these 
licensing systems can enable mass licensing without user intervention. Current examples include 
advertising revenues, as operate automatically on youtube.com,101 or subsidies through other means 
such as taxation or other subscription models.102 Another option could be to run a levy system 
whereby originators of 3D printed products are financially rewarded for their creations for that same 
period of duration. 
 
The test for infringement would operate in a similar manner to copyright law, but in a manner that is 
more straightforward for the purposes of legal certainty. In the US, for instance, there are multiple 
tests within the various state jurisdictions and court circuits, 103  and whilst the UK has a more 
narrowed set of tests, there is still uncertainty. In the UK, derivation and taking of a substantial part 
need to be proven,104 but the copyright statute, the CDPA 1988, does not provide details and so 
consequently there have been numerous interpretations. It is suggested that the proposed provision 
provides greater certainty105 due to the wording of the provision mirroring existing case law.106 That 
case law provides courts and right holders with sufficient certainty in any sui generis dispute. A court 
would apply the known case law, and thus whether labour, skill and effort has been reproduced from 
an earlier 3DP work into a subsequent work. For example, if 3DP Star Wars work is reproduced in a 
subsequent work, then the courts would assess whether a substantial part of the skill, labour and 
effort that went into the original work has been reproduced. If so, then the traditional remedies for 
infringement could be sought.107 
 
(b) The proposed system where there is ‘not an original work’ 
 
In discussing (b) - the issue of protecting a work that is potentially infringing an existing IP right - 3D 
printing becomes particularly problematic for the reasons previously covered. The sui generis right 
would operate so as to override the existing set of IP rights in that work, so that whereas before there 
                                               
100 See www.copyrighthub.org and G Grassie, ‘A UK Digital Copyright Exchange: Will the pipe dream ever become a 
reality’, (2013) 7 JIPL&P 23 and J Griffin, ‘The Digital Copyright Exchange: Threats and Opportunities’ (2013) 27 IRevLCT 
5 (2013)  
101 See above n.71 
102 This is outside of the scope of this paper but details can be found in Anderson, Free (Random House 2010) and J 
Griffin, Making a new copyright economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary exploitation in Copyright, 
[2013] IPQ 69; on the broader relationship between capitalism and cultural works – J Beuys, What is Money, (trans. 
Boccon-Gibod, Forest Row: Clairview Books, 2010),  U Roesch, We are the Revolution!, (Forrest Row: Temple Lodge, 
2013) and in particular J Beuys, Appeal by Joseph Beuys [Poster], 1980 available at 
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/beuys-appeal-by-joseph-beuys-ar00853 - legible copy on file with author. 
103 For a basic overview, see D Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, Volume 4, Chapter 13 (Albany: Matthew Bender, 2010).  
104 S.17 CDPA 1988. 
105 It is also worth noting that the current copyright infringement test is largely reliant on case law, rather than being 
detailed within a statute. 
106 See n.95.  
107 G Davies, N Caddick, & G Harbattole, Copinger and Skone-James, n.10, Part VI.  
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could have been a multitudinous set of claims, under the proposed system there remains but one sui 
generis right.   This would mean protection would exist if there is sufficient labour, such as investment 
and technological skill, and that infringement would occur if there was an appropriation of that 
investment and skill from someone else. In this way the proposed right does operate quite similarly 
to the database sui generis right, and again those concepts within copyright infringement rules. So, if 
a model of an existing 3D printed work is qualitatively substantively reproduced in terms of the labour 
involved in making the original work, there will be an infringement. However, what would be the 
situation where the 3D print involves reproduction of an existing (and otherwise not 3D printed) 
copyright work? The paper suggests the following provision to be added to the one mentioned above: 
 
“The sui generis right will not override existing IP rights in existing works that are not 3D printed 
works” 
 
This would provide a means for existing IP right holders to be able to still bring infringement actions 
against those producing infringing versions of their works. This would help to preserve some of the 
existing IP balance, which combined with the new sui generis right could encourage existing right 
holders to either produce 3DP goods or license their existing IPR. If the 3DP sui generis right could 
override existing rights, then a situation similar to that with the database right could arise – namely, 
the fear, until William Hill,108 that the sui generis right could be used to enhance IP protection for 
existing works. By way of example, under the proposed system if someone places online a 3DP 
version of a Star Wars character, then IPR would need to licensed, or permission obtained, from the 
right holder if it would result in an infringement of existing IP such as copyright.  
 
 
The process of implementation 
 
The passing of a sui generis right in the manner proposed would require amendment of existing 
statutes, which could prove problematic. For instance, the CDPA 1988 in the UK would require 
significant amendment and limitation in order to enable the overriding of the proposed technology 
right.  There are also clear issues in relation to international law. There are a number of international 
treaties, for instance the Berne Convention 1886,109 the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996,110 the World 
                                               
108 See n.81. 
109 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised in Paris on July 24, 1971 
and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986)  [The 1979 amended version does not appear in UNTS or ILM, but 
the 1971 Paris revision is available at 1161 UNTS 30 (1971)]. 
110 WIPO Copyright Treaty, 36 ILM 65 (1997). 
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Patent Cooperation Treaty,111 to name but a few, which clearly set out the necessity of the traditional 
rights. Not conforming to these could lead to a breach of international law with all that entails.  
 
In terms of substantive implementation, the proposed sui generis right must be registered and thus 
a registration system needs to be instituted. It is necessary for other right holders and users to 
understand what has been protected. The lack of registration within copyright law (notwithstanding 
the US system)112 has merely led to more users being uncertain about knowing what is and is not 
permitted by the law. The system of registration should therefore be as open as possible. Also the 
proposed law needs to be structured so as to safeguard against abuses in a manner perhaps similar 
to patent law - patent law has been subject, particularly in the US, to trolling. 113  This is where 
individuals and companies register patents for the sole purpose of profiteering from them rather than 
for the purposes of actually exploiting the inventions therein. This is something that the proposed 
system should be particularly aware of, especially as the potential scope of the right is extremely 
broad. The consequences of it being overbroad could be disastrous for societal development due the 
scope of the right. For this reason and despite potential delays registration should be operated in a 
manner similar to the old patent and trademark systems, namely ones which enables individuals to 
be able to challenge the registration of a right prior to that right taking effect.114 Individuals should 
be able to argue that the provision of the right is overbroad and would have a restrictive effects upon 
the development of future technologies. Partly to deal with this threat, it is also suggested that the 
duration of the right be more limited than many of the existing rights. Whilst a period of protection 
of 70 years from the date of registration has been proposed,115 it is also suggested that further to 
successful implementation of the right the duration of the right could then be varied within certain 
instances to reflect differences between the technology or content concerned - and it might be 
possible to do so in relation to the ‘level’ of the content or technology that is involved. The notion of 
‘level’ refers to whether the technology or content involved is closer to that of being base content or 
a primary tool, more secondary content or a secondary tool, or even a third level content or 
technology. In other words, we are utilising the categorisations mentioned earlier in this paper that 
were used by Luciano Floridi when he suggested that technological tools can be broken into particular 
categories according to what they build up and what they could lead to. 116These categorisations 
                                               
111 Patent Cooperation Treaty, Washington 19th June 1970 as amended 28th September 1979, modified on 3rd February 
1984 and 3rd October 2001 28 UST 7645 , 9 ILM 978 (1970). 
112 17 USC §411 - For details see https://www.copyright.gov/registration/ - registration of the containing work is 
required to begin infringement proceedings of a copyright. 
113 J Bessen and M Meurer, Patent Failure (New Jersey: Princetown University Press, 2008). 
114 For instance, the old law in the UK that permitted relative grounds of refusal to be raised by the examiner and other 
parties prior to the 2007 regulation change. 
115 Infra p**. 
116 L Floridi, The Fourth Revolution (Oxford: OUP, 2014), at 26-34. There is some analogy to the notion of “essential 
technology” in A Brown, Intellectual property, human rights and competition: access to essential innovation and 
technology (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), at 1, or the notion of protocol layers: T Wu, Who Controls the Internet 
(Oxford: OUP,2006) Part I and Part II.  
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could be achieved in a number of ways – for instance, an examiner in a Patent Office could assess the 
relevant level, or it could be assessed according to sales data to predict when certain types of 
technology build upon others. Licensing agreements could be lodged with the IPO to help make such 
a determination, alongside tracking information concerning use. For example, if a 3D printer is used 
for making engine parts, then the licences required could be identified by registration of those 
agreements, by assessing other goods purchased by a particular class of consumer, or we can use 
these categorisations in order to provide the duration of protection. This could be achieved using 
online systems to observe the sales data of works and inventions, in order to assess the average 
period during which a particular technology brings in reward for right holders; after that period, the 
protection could be lifted or reduced. Computer systems utilising a mathematical algorithm,117 as 
defined by an organisation such as the Copyright Tribunal or UK-IPO, could be used.118 This might 
even bring in more money for the original right holder because it may open their works and goods to 
a wider market.119  
 
These categorisations can also be used in order to establish the scope of the protection. For instance, 
it may be possible that more investment is required for a primary level tool whereas a third level 
audit tool should require less investment. This would mean that there is a similarity to the amount of 
investment put into certain levels. Flexibility in the system would also allow those who produce tools 
that were originally third order but become first order will ultimately become rewarded to a greater 
degree for their success. Thus if someone produces a work such as a computer game which becomes 
commercially successful later on, and is used as the basis for subsequent works, it can be considered 
to be a more elementary level work and consequently more deserving of protection. This could lead 
to greater financial reward. Such a system requires constant scrutiny (e.g. by a body such as the 
Copyright Hub) and so should also be capable of being altered, so that those levels of protection 
which turn out to be overbroad can also be modified by a court through a standard court process set 
out in statute. This would help alleviate some of the issues that have occurred within the biotech 
context where technological protection through patents have turned out to be overbroad. 
 
Notwithstanding the above flexibilities, layering rewards in this manner could lead to restricted 
development, if for instance a licensing fee has to be paid every time what could be termed an 
elementary level technology is utilised. This is not necessarily restrictive of innovation - a well-known 
example today is the competition that arose between proprietary Microsoft Windows, which 
required a fee to be paid in order to use it, and the ‘free’ open Source software whose source code 
remained open to developers. However if an underlying technology, such as an operating system, 
                                               
117 Above n.102.  
118 M Freegard, ‘40 years on: An appraisal of the UK Copyright Tribunal, 1957-1996’, (1998) 177 Revue Internationale du 
Droit d’autuer’ 2; http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ctribunal/ctribunal-about/ctribunal-about-membership.htm. On the Copyright 
Hub see infra n.100 . 
119 Infra p.**. 
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leads to a bottleneck - of which there is equal historical evidence, for instance the technologies used 
within aeroplanes as discussed by Kitsch,120 Mergers and Nelson121 - then thought should be given to 
providing a system that can avoid that bottleneck. There is some evidence of such a ‘bottle-neck 
avoiding’ system starting to develop in relation to Youtube videos where advertising is mandated 
where there is a possible claim of copyright infringement and those who own the copyright to take 
the advertising revenue.122 Something similar could be used in relation to the utilisation of lower level 
technologies. In addition to that there is also the chance that the exposure to that technology will 
lead to people more likely to purchase other goods and services from that particular right holder. In 
any event the case can certainly be made that it is possible to provide a layered level of protection of 
the sort being proposed here without it inhibiting the development of dependent content or 
technologies. 
 
In summary, therefore, the proposed system would provide a sui generis right over 3DP content 
which right holders could use to exclusively exploit the work. This right would not override existing 
IP, and so would remain vulnerable to claims from existing IP right holders. The sui generis would 
need to be registered, and would then last for 70 years from the date of registration. The right would 
cover the labour, skill and effort that went into the production of the registered work, which would 
take the existing definitions of those terms from existing UK case law. The right will help to encourage 
investment in 3D works, whilst maintaining a balance with existing IP right interests. In order to keep 
the right appropriately balanced, it is argued that it could be possible to amend the scope or duration 
of protection according to the degree to which the right is used in relation to works that come to 
form the basis of subsequent works, in order to encourage subsequent uses. This could be achieved 
by providing a degree of licensing fees to the original right holder. The proposed right would have 
the basic elements set out in statute, such as the CDPA 1988, with the details of the proposed system 
then being administered by a body such as the Copyright Hub. That body will monitor the system and 
carry out alterations to duration as it sees fit given access to data looking at the use and re-use of 
existing protected works. Taken as a whole, it is argued that this proposal will then help to further 
encourage investment in 3DP, providing a greater degree of certainty than is currently the case with 
3DP protection. As has been argued above, the current system suffers from inherent uncertainty in 
the levels of protection provided, which has been exacerbated by the continued convergence of 
technologies and also of the law. The proposed 3DP right is a means by which to deal with the issues 
posed by convergence, and to signify to right holders that there is a clear means by which to obtain 
reward for labour, skill and effort put into the making of 3DP works.  
  
 
                                               
120 E Kitch, The nature and function of the Patent System, 20 Journal of Law and Economics 265 (1977) 
121 R Merges, and R Nelson, ‘On the complex economics of Patent Scope’, 90 Columbia Law Review 839 (1990). 
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Conclusion 
 
The shortcomings within the regulation of 3D printing reveals an increasingly important issue within 
legal regulation – namely, that of increasing convergence. Legal convergence is being driven by 
convergence within the technologies – 3D printing reveals that convergence is increasingly an issue 
in the way in which newer technologies can bring together previously disparate areas. For instance, 
it is now possible to easily embed a literary work within a physical invention, in a way that even ten 
years ago would not have been expected. However, this is now something potentially commonplace 
with any 3D printed work, not to mention all the other types of IP right which may also be involved. 
This leads to law being self-conflicting and self-defeating in terms of meeting their aims.123 For this 
reason, it is extremely important that any proposed reforms need to keep in mind a holistic approach 
to 3D printing; the regulation needs to operate in a manner that enables regulation to map onto 
future technologies. The proposed sui generis 3D printing right has been designed with this in mind. 
The right has been founded in the historical explanations for IP protection, and furthermore, also the 
ex-post justifications. It has been proposed that labour is the key ingredient, and thus that labour 
should remain as the justification for the sui generis right. Convergence poses a number of issues 
with any such right, namely that as technologies converge existing protection will overlap, and that 
protection may end up being overbroad. The right adopts two approaches – firstly, that the levels of 
duration should vary according to the technical level of the work; secondly, that the proposed right 
should not set aside existing IP rights.  
 
The proposed right may encounter considerable opposition should the right ever be implemented. 
However, it is critical that such an approach be taken. The operation of so many divergent and 
disparate sets of regulation over a single object merely leads to confusion and it leads to self-
defeating law. Convergence means that differing legal protection, which may have originally served 
different purposes, will come to focus on the same points, the same issues, but due merely to 
historical precedent, will come to focus on older, less relevant issues as part of the balancing exercise 
within their respective fields. Meanwhile, technological convergence moves on and the law is left 
governing fields of irrelevance. Jamie Boyle wrote about how there needed to be aspects of creativity 
fostered by regulation to encourage the continued development of inventions, e.g. the public 
domain.124 However, there is also a need to ensure that such protections do not develop in a way 
that inhibits the development of technologies which result in legal convergence. If such piecemeal 
legal protection continues to influence the development of technologies, then regulation will either 
depart from that which it purports to regulate, or the technologies will become stymied within the 
relevant jurisdiction. The proposed sui generis right for 3DP therefore raises and poses questions that 
regulators should keep in mind whenever regulating technologies. Regulation is not about merely 
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regulating the technologies of today, but also the technologies of tomorrow. This calls for holistic 
approaches, to ensure that future technologies, such as 3DP, are not inhibited by conflicting and 
overlapping laws caused by the convergence of technology. 
 
 
 
